Chapter 14 Responsibility for Fundamentalist Belief

There are arguably moral, legal, and prudential constraints on behavior. But are there epistemic constraints on belief? Are there any requirements arising from intellectual considerations alone? This volume includes original essays written by top epistemologists that address this and closely related...

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Hlavní autor:	Peels, Rik
Médium:	Online
Jazyk:	angličtina
Vydáno:	Taylor & Francis 2021
Témata:	Andrew Reisner Anne Meylan Anthony Robert Booth belief Clayton Littlejohn dialogical foundationalism doxastic dilemma doxastic duties Ema Sullivan-Bissett epistemic duties epistemic normativity epistemic obligation epistemic tension epistemology evidence functions implicit bias Jennifer Lackey Jonathan Matheson Kevin McCain Lindsay Rettler Lisa Bortolotti Luis Oliveira Mark T. Nelson Matthias Steup Miriam Schleifer McCormick obligation open-mindedness ought to believe ought to reflect thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy::QDT Topics in philosophy::QDTK Philosophy: epistemology and theory of knowledge
On-line přístup:	ONIX_20210202_9780429641794_chpt_40
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Chapter 14 Responsibility for Fundamentalist Belief

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